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 C H A P T E R  6 
 Disentangling Reasons 
and Rationalizations: Exploring 
Perceived Fairness in 
Hypothetical Societies 
 Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock 
 Abstract 
 Political psychologists often treat explicit explanations for political views as 
rationalizations rather than reasons and favor unconscious motives and cog-
nitive processes as the key determinants of political ideology. We argue 
that “transparent-motive” theories are often dismissed too quickly in favor of 
“subterranean-motive” theories. We devote this chapter to fi nding common 
methodological ground for clarifying, testing, and circumscribing the claims of 
both the transparent-motivational theorists and the subterranean-motivational 
theorists, and we pose a series of empirical questions designed to explore pre-
dictions that might provide evidence that justifi cations are not mere by-products 
of the functional imperative to defend the status quo but rather functionally au-
tonomous constellations of ideas capable of independently infl uencing policy. 
 Over the last 150 years, behavioral scientists have repeatedly revealed their 
deep skepticism of the reasons that ordinary mortals offer for their political 
views. As an epistemic community, we have shown a marked preference for 
“subterranean-motivational theories”—theories predicated on the assump-
tion that people have little access to the true drivers of their judgments. 
Indeed, under this subterranean rubric we include a truly diverse mix of 
scholars, ranging from the Freudian to the evolutionary to the Marxist: psy-
chodynamic scholars, such as Lasswell (1930) and Adorno and colleagues 
(1950), who view political attitudes as the product of the displacement of 
private motives onto public objects rationalized in terms of the common 
good; evolutionary and social-dominance theorists who argue that people 
derive psychic gratifi cation from exercising symbolic dominance over those 
below them in the pecking order (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Platto, 2001); 
system justifi cation theorists who posit a deep-rooted psychological ten-
dency to justify existing status hierarchies (a tendency that bears a marked 
family resemblance to the classic Marxist notion of false consciousness—Jost 
& Banaji, 1994; Jost, 1995); and social identity theorists who maintain that 
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 127
self-esteem needs guided by rapid-fi re categorization processes are respon-
sible for the widespread phenomenon of invidious ingroup-outgroup ste-
reotyping (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). 
 We do not doubt that good reasons often exist for doubting the reasons 
people offer for their policy stands—and for suspecting that these reasons 
do not capture the true causal dynamics behind their opinions. We readily 
concede that there are serious cognitive limits on our introspective access to 
mental processes—and powerful sources of social desirability distortion op-
erating on what people are willing to say. But, like the plain-spoken sociolo-
gist, C. Wright Mills (1940), we worry about “motive-mongering.” Indeed, if 
we were inclined to subterranean-motivational speculation of our own, we 
might suggest that subterranean motives drive the intense curiosity of social 
scientists in subterranean motives—be it the preventive goal of ensuring that 
their research conclusions not be labeled obvious or the promotional goal of 
being proclaimed profound. We also worry that in a discipline as ideologi-
cally lopsided as political psychology, the subterranean-motivational specula-
tion can easily become skewed against groups in collective disfavor (Arkes & 
Tetlock, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006; Redding, 2004; 
Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1991). 
 Whatever the merits of such speculation, we are acutely aware of how 
diffi cult it is to resolve disputes over the merits of transparent versus subter-
ranean-motivational theories—and distinguish reason from rationalization 
in social, personality, organizational, and political psychology. (One of us 
wrote many years ago on the indeterminacy problems that bedeviled far less 
politically charged efforts to distinguish cognitive from motivational, and 
“intrapsychic” from impression management, explanations in a variety of 
experimental paradigms; Tetlock & Levi, 1982; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985.) 
But we do think it vital—for reasons laid out later—to try. And we devote 
this chapter to fi nding common methodological ground for clarifying, test-
ing, and circumscribing the claims of both the transparent-motivational the-
orists and the subterranean-motivational theorists. 
 We divide our chapter into three sections. In the fi rst, we make our case 
for an underutilized methodology: transforming political-philosophical 
thought experiments into psychological experiments. In the second section, 
we describe a series of hypothetical-society laboratory studies that we have 
conducted over the last 15 years to explore the value judgments that guide 
people when they make “macro-distributive” judgment calls about the fair-
ness of resource allocations on a societal and even global scale. These stud-
ies allow us to compare how closely the belief and value systems of actual 
human beings resemble a host of conceptual ideal types, including intuitive 
Rawlsians (who give priority to raising the guaranteed safety net income), 
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128 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
intuitive libertarians (who give priority to minimizing redistribution and 
maximizing aggregate wealth), intuitive Marxists (who reject all forms of 
class subjugation), intuitive Durkheimians (who place a premium on the 
solidarity-expressive functions of punishment), and value-pluralist pragma-
tists (who strike varying compromises between equality and  effi ciency—and 
other values). In the third section, we pose a series of questions designed to 
explore what, if any, predictions can be derived from system justifi cation 
theory (SJT) and kindred subterranean formulations in the  hypothetical-
 society context—and to determine the types of evidence necessary to  induce
advocates of such theories to change their minds: to view justifi cations not as 
by-products of the functional imperative to defend the status quo but rather 
as functionally autonomous constellations of ideas capable of independently 
infl uencing policy. The theoretical debate is as old as that between Marx and 
Weber: How do interests (traditionally stressed by Marxists) and ideas (tra-
ditionally stressed by Weberians) interact to shape our vision of who we col-
lectively are and what we should collectively aspire to achieve? 
 TURNING THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 
INTO LAB EXPERIMENTS 
 Carefully conducted thought experiments help philosophers clarify the role 
of competing principles and assumptions in their normative arguments, 
much like laboratory experiments help psychologists clarify the role of dif-
ferent variables in cause–effect relationships. In the mind of a philosopher 
committed to working out the logical implications of propositions in alter-
native worlds, the thought experiment can be a rigorous means to an end: 
“She follows through all the relevant implications of altering one part of 
her worldview and attempts to construct a coherent model of the situation 
she is imagining. The rigor with which thought experimenters attempt to 
answer ‘what if’ questions is what differentiates thought experiments from 
daydreams and much fi ction. . . . The thought experimenter is committed to 
rigorously considering all relevant consequences in answering the ‘what if’ 
questions” (Cooper, 2005, p. 337). 
 Thought experiments, however, even when done carefully and with a 
mind open to possibilities rather than searching for confi rmation, lack the 
transparency and replicability deemed essential to scientifi c research (Bunge, 
1961). These weaknesses lead many to dismiss the thought experiment as 
a path to reliable knowledge (see Sorenson, 1992, Chapter 2). Thus, when 
scientists successfully employ thought experiments—Galileo, Newton, and 
Einstein come quickly to mind—the resulting theories must be couched in 
publicly testable terms to qualify as scientifi c (Dennett, 2003). 
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 129
 Thought experiments also present serious external validity concerns. 
Whereas laboratory researchers can make some claim that their fi ndings rep-
resent the views of a cross-section of college students reacting to real, if simu-
lated, situations, thought experimenters can make no claim that their fi ndings 
represent the views of people in general, or even philosophers specifi cally, 
reacting to realistic simulations. Indeed, many philosophical debates persist 
because philosophers reach different conclusions about hypothetical cases or 
the validity of background assumptions in these cases (e.g., Coleman, 2000), 
and the very purpose of many thought experiments is to create  unreal situa-
tions that can exist only in the imagination (Souder, 2003). 
 For the empiricist who fi nds a thought experiment interesting but doubts 
the reliability and generalizability of its product, a simple solution exists: 
reduce the thought experiment to concrete terms that can be reproduced as 
written scenarios and ask subjects to react to the scenarios to see what trends 
emerge (e.g., Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004). The emerging fi eld of 
experimental philosophy seeks to do just this with a variety of conundrums 
(Knobe, in press). But that view emphasizes what laboratory studies can do 
for thought experiments and philosophical explorations. In our view, thought 
experiments can do much for laboratory studies and the social- psychological
explorations of a variety of topics, including the psychological foundations 
of lay conceptions of justice. 
 Empirical studies into the perceived justice of real-world outcomes and 
procedures confront diffi culties that may be partially remedied by incorpo-
rating elements of thought experiments into these studies. First, and almost 
impossible to control in empirical studies of public reasoning on current con-
troversies, is the problem that public opinion often depends on mixtures of 
emotionally charged political values (such as liberty, equality, religious pu-
rity, and national sovereignty) and technically complex matters of fact (such 
as whether individual or societal conditions are greater determinants of 
economic outcomes or whether tying welfare benefi ts to work requirements 
will encourage self-suffi ciency). When causal relations and policy effects are 
diffi cult to determine, a powerful temptation exists to arrange one’s beliefs 
about the facts in convenient ways that minimize dissonance and mental 
strain (e.g., Herrmann, Tetlock, & Diascro, 2001; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, 
& Ordóñez, 1993; Skitka, 1999). For instance, Skitka and Tetlock (1992, 1993) 
found that liberals and conservatives held different preexisting beliefs about 
the causes of public assistance and, as a result, made different trade-offs in a 
mock public aid allocation task. Thus, surveys that fi nd different views about 
distributive justice between liberals and conservatives, but fail to check for 
differences in background beliefs, may mistakenly attribute response differ-
ences to value differences. Conversely, surveys that fi nd agreement across 
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130 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
groups regarding distributive justice and the propriety of redistribution may 
simply refl ect widespread mistaken beliefs about underlying facts, such as 
the degree of economic mobility in a society (see Ferrie, 2005; Fong, 2005) or 
the proportion of families in different socio-economic categories (see Klue-
gel, Csepeli, Kolosi, Orkeny, & Nemenyi, 1995). These problems become 
particularly acute when one studies the impact of macroeconomic variables 
and system-level conditions on individual judgments of justice, but informa-
tional problems may arise whenever key facts are vague or disputed (e.g., the 
bargaining studies of Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). 
 To overcome such confusion, we took a page from the philosopher’s book 
on thought experiments and developed a “hypothetical-society paradigm,” 
in which experimental participants judge the justice of different economic 
and legal arrangements in hypothetical societies (Mitchell et al., 1993). 1 This 
paradigm turns the classic weakness of thought experiments, their unreality 
and subjectivity, into a strength: because the experimenter is the creator of 
the hypothetical societies, the experimenter controls the structure of these 
societies down to the tiniest technical details, including the location of the 
poverty line and percentage of persons below it, mean income and income 
variance within the society, levels of redistribution and welfare services, 
the level of meritocracy (i.e., the degree to which individual merit versus 
other factors determine economic outcomes), and whether the hypotheti-
cal society is in the “original position” or considering changes to existing 
procedures and distributions. Using the hypothetical-society approach, an 
investigator can examine which features of societies are most important to 
people’s judgments of social justice and determine how these judgments 
change as features of the societies change. In short, the paradigm allows 
1 The inspiration for the hypothetical-society paradigm was Rawls’ impartial reasoning 
device, the “veil of ignorance,” which seeks to “nullify the effects of specifi c contingencies 
which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their 
own advantage” (Rawls, 1971, p. 136). Behind the veil, “no one knows his place in society, 
his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural 
assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls, 1971, p. 137). Because 
we cannot divest participants of self-knowledge as required by a true veil of ignorance, we 
chose instead to remove narrow self-interest as an infl uence on judgments by having par-
ticipants disinterestedly evaluate hypothetical societies. Our efforts to approximate Rawls’ 
original position were predated by Brickman (1977) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992). 
Appendices in Mitchell et al. (1993) and Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, and Lerner (2003) pro-
vide detailed descriptions of the hypothetical societies, the instructions given to participants, 
and the participants’ tasks.
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 131
researchers to unconfound the infl uence of factual beliefs from that of value 
orientations in judgments of justice. Because individuals tend to avoid value 
trade-offs, often by interpreting ambiguous or disputed facts in a favorable 
light (e.g., Tetlock & McGuire, 1986), this ability to manipulate value confl ict 
confers considerable experimental advantages. 
 One key benefi t of importing hypothetical societies into the laboratory is 
the control one gains over otherwise complex and sharply contested matters 
of fact. A second, arguably equally important, benefi t involves the control 
one gains over the infl uence of selfi sh interests. A common problem in em-
pirical studies of justice is that of distinguishing biased from unbiased judg-
ments (see Fong et al., 2006; Konow, 2005; Liebig, 2001). The hypothetical-
society paradigm allows researchers to place participants in the position of 
impartial spectator: researchers who want to eliminate or minimize the role 
of material self-interest and social infl uence on judgments ask participants to 
make anonymous judgments about hypothetical societies with no material 
implications for themselves. Alternatively, researchers interested in the role 
of social infl uences can ask participants to explain or justify their judgments 
under various accountability conditions, or can manipulate the group identi-
ties involved, whereas researchers interested in the infl uence of material self-
interest can alter the method to have participants imagine themselves inside 
the society or ask them to allocate resources within the society (using either 
hypothetical or real pay-offs). 
 In our hypothetical-society studies, we have favored experimental ma-
nipulations that place the participant in the role of impartial spectator, in 
order to capture unbiased judgments of justice. As a number of studies have 
shown, when participants have a stake in the distribution at hand, egocen-
tric and ingroup biases will often infl uence participants’ judgments about 
the fairness of these distributions (Bar-Hillel & Yaari, 1993; Epley & Caruso, 
2004; Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1997, 2000; Greenberg, 1983; Konow, 2005; 
Messick & Sentis, 1983; Pillutla & Murnighan, 2003). We cannot trust that 
unbiased judgments of justice will be given when individuals judge their 
own situations, and so, if we seek to know what people believe justice ide-
ally requires, “thought experiments trump real experiments (Cooper, 2005, 
p. 344).” 2
2 Cooper (2005) makes this point in the context of thought experiments involving trade-offs 
between avoiding torture to oneself versus avoiding harm to others, where what we seek to 
know is not what the tortured person would actually do but what a rational person should 
do in such a situation: “The judgments of people contemplating what should be done under 
torture are more reliable than the judgments of people actually being tortured (p. 344).”
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132 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
 That said, judgments about justice by detached observers of hypothetical 
societies may still be useful guides about judgments of justice in real societ-
ies. Most obviously, to the extent that hypothetical societies and real societies 
possess common features important to lay conceptions of justice, judgments 
about justice in the hypothetical societies may generalize to real societies. 
Even with highly artifi cial scenarios, judgments about hypothetical societies 
can identify pivotal points of agreement and disagreement and explain how 
factual beliefs and value differences combine to produce either ideological 
convergence or divergence. For instance, in our fi rst set of hypothetical-
 society studies (Mitchell et al., 1993), we found surprisingly wide agreement 
on the importance of minimum safety nets, even in perfect meritocracies. 
Hypothetical-society studies also shed light on which social arrangements 
may have the greatest “psychological stability” (see Elster, 1995). Our stud-
ies have found, for example, that conservatives are more sensitive to waste 
in income redistribution policies (“leaky buckets”) than liberals when the 
redistribution was meant for deserving recipients (Mitchell et al., 2003), sug-
gesting that the psychological stability of policy arrangements depends on 
the mix of liberal and conservative decision makers, the perceived deserv-
ingness of would-be recipients in the applicant pool, and the leakiness of the 
income transfer process (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993). 
 More ambitiously, to the extent that the judgments individuals reach as 
impartial spectators cause individuals to refl ect on just distributions in their 
own societies, the hypothetical-society paradigm could be used as a device 
to foster deliberation about social policy (e.g., Fishkin, 1992). If used in this 
sense, the hypothetical-society paradigm performs a “refl ective equilibrium” 
function (Rawls, 1971; see Daniels, 1996), possibly leading persons to aban-
don their initial intuitions or change their views about what justice requires 
once they are compelled to work their way through a series of controlled 
thought experiments. 
 In sum, the hypothetical-society paradigm can be a powerful tool for 
overcoming the limitations of alternative methods, including the problems of 
replication and “idiosyncratic intuition” that plague philosophical thought 
experiments on justice, and the problems of partiality—with respect both to 
facts and motivations—that plague lab and fi eld studies of justice. 3
3 A closely related device for studying justice judgments is the vignette study (e.g., Bukszar & 
Knetsch, 1997; Konow, 2003). Vignette studies typically ask experimental or survey par-
ticipants to judge whether justice occurred in some realistic but imaginary event (e.g., 
pay  distribution in a hypothetical work setting). The advantage of a vignette study over 
a hypothetical-society study is that the former possesses greater external validity. The
Jost, John T., et al. Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification, Oxford University Press,
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 133
 TAKING STOCK OF THE CURRENT EMPIRICAL YIELD 
FROM HYPOTHETICAL-SOCIETY STUDIES 
 Most studies using the hypothetical-society paradigm examine the perceived 
justice of societal-level patterns of distribution or rules for distributing re-
sources within a society, and so we begin with fi ndings from these studies 
on social justice. We fi rst utilized the paradigm to examine how people make 
macro-level trade-offs between equality and effi ciency. Specifi cally, we de-
scribed for participants three different societies that differed in their levels 
of meritocracy, with the correlation between effort and outcome being high 
(a correlation of 0.9), medium (a correlation of 0.5), or low (a correlation of 
0.1), and we displayed income distributions within each society that varied 
in terms of their equality (income variance) and effi ciency (average income). 
(For a full description of the hypothetical-society instructions and stimuli, 
see the Appendix to Mitchell et al., 1993.) Participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as outside observers of the societies and to make pair-wise com-
parisons of all possible income distributions for one of the societies, choosing 
which distribution in each pair was fairer, so that a fairness ranking of income 
distributions could be derived for each individual within a society and for 
groups of individuals across all three hypothetical societies. These fairness 
rankings were then compared to a variety of ideal-type fairness rankings 
for the income distributions derived from competing theories of distributive 
justice, namely, egalitarianism (emphasizing equality), utilitarianism (em-
phasizing effi ciency), a Rawlsian maximin principle (emphasizing quality 
subject to effi ciency constraints), and Boulding’s (1962) compromise theory 
(emphasizing effi ciency subject to equality constraints—in which minimum 
equality is required by the government ensuring a safety net for the poor, but 
the goal of prosperity is encouraged by rewarding individual effort above 
this social safety net). 
 Consistent with Boulding’s (1962) compromise theory, as well as with 
later value-pluralism ideas (Tetlock, 1984, 1986), both liberals and conser-
vatives were willing to accept considerable inequality of wealth in high-
meritocracy societies but with the reservation that distributions allowing 
people to fall below the poverty line remained unpopular for both ideo-
disadvantage of the vignette study relative to the hypothetical-society study is that, because 
the participant may fi nd the vignette more realistic and familiar, the participant may fi nd it 
more diffi cult to imagine or accept the stipulated facts and detach herself from the situation 
about which she is supposed to be an impartial judge, and the researcher has less freedom 
when creating hypothetical situations.
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134 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
logical groups even in high-meritocracy societies (a fi nding similar to that 
of Frohlich and  Oppenheimer, 1992, whose experimental groups favored 
utilitarianism above a fl oor constraint). However, a majority of liberals  and
conservatives favored a Rawlsian “maximin” approach (Rawls, 1971) to the 
distribution of wealth in low- and moderate-meritocracy societies (a fi nding 
at odds with Frohlich and Oppenheimer [1992] and one that suggests that 
implicit assumptions of meritocracy may have driven Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer’s groups to favor a modifi ed utilitarianism). Liberals and conserva-
tives disagreed most sharply when the reward structure in the hypothetical 
society was most ambiguous (i.e., in the moderate-meritocracy society), with 
liberals tending toward greater equality and conservatives toward greater 
effi ciency in such societies. Thus, we found that, for both ideological groups, 
beliefs about the level of meritocracy in the hypothetical society moderated 
value trade-offs, suggesting that ideological disagreements about social jus-
tice may arise just as often from different beliefs about the nature of the 
reward structure in society as from value differences (compare Fong, 2004, 
reporting that target-specifi c beliefs regarding individual responsibility for 
economic outcomes drove attitudes toward redistributive policies). 
 In a subsequent hypothetical-society study using similar experimental 
stimuli (Mitchell et al., 2003), we again found that the perceived level of 
meritocracy in a society greatly affected judgments about the justice of dis-
tributions in that society, with support for greater equality (and less prosper-
ity) strongest at low levels of meritocracy and support for greater prosperity 
(and less equality) strongest at high levels of meritocracy. In this study, we 
also manipulated whether participants were judging the fairness of income 
distributions as if they were alternative  original distributions for each society 
versus as if they were  redistributions of income from an existing distribution 
in each society. When participants judged  re distributions (i.e., when it was 
clear that income would be taken from one group and redistributed to an-
other), both liberals and conservatives became more sensitive to the level of 
meritocracy in the society, and considered redistributions in the moderate- 
and high-meritocracy societies to be signifi cantly less fair than equivalent 
distributions viewed as alternative starting distributions in the same societ-
ies. Further, for all three societies, including a “no-meritocracy” society with 
no relation between effort and outcomes, participants judged redistributions 
that led to losses in equality or losses in prosperity to be less fair than when 
they simply judged the fairness of these distributions as possible “original 
positions,” suggesting a vicarious type of loss aversion at work even in judg-
ments about hypothetical redistributions. 
 These fi ndings highlight both the practical problems faced by advocates 
of redistributive policies and the conceptual problems faced by political phi-
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 135
losophers grappling with whether (or when) the distributive–redistributive 
distinction should count in normative theories of justice. These fi ndings also 
highlight interpretive ambiguities that arise for psychological theorists in 
characterizing the true causes of resistance to redistribution. If people resist 
redistribution because they have a tendency to adopt the status quo as their 
reference point and to be loss-averse (directly or vicariously), as prospect the-
ory predicts, is it accurate or fair to characterize such automatic psychophysi-
cal processes with as politically charged a label as system justifi cation? 4 
 Providing further empirical evidence against a unidimensional concep-
tion of distributive justice such as utilitarianism and in favor of a multidimen-
sional conception such as in Boulding’s compromise theory, Ordóñez and 
Mellers (1993) used the hypothetical-society paradigm to examine whether 
individuals make trade-offs when judging social fairness. They found that 
the great majority of participants did make trade-offs between different prin-
ciples, but the principles that most concerned their participants were need 
and desert, with participants wanting to ensure a minimum salary for all 
members of the hypothetical society but also wanting to provide just deserts 
to those who worked hard in the society; equality and effi ciency were of little 
concern to participants in this study. This study is also interesting because 
Ordóñez and Mellers asked participants to make judgments about the fair-
ness of societies, but also to express preferences for societies as places to live. 
They found that most participants rated high-meritocracy societies as fair, but 
they preferred to live in societies with high minimum incomes (a fi nding that 
applied particularly to participants with self-reported low socio-economic 
status). This fi nding is consistent with the view that the hypothetical-society 
paradigm can be used to elicit both refi ned justice judgments and preference 
judgments refl ecting self-interest rather than ethical concerns. 
 Recently, Scott and his colleagues (Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Born-
stein, 2001) employed a variant of the hypothetical-society paradigm to com-
pare the role of equality, effi ciency, merit, and need in people’s judgments 
4 Although system justifi cation theorists draw on status quo bias research to support their 
theory (Jost, 2001), we see nothing intrinsically system justifying about prospect theory. Pros-
pect theory processes can just as easily fuel moral outrage as moral complacency toward the 
status quo (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). For instance, prospect theory identifi es 
factors that should make it easier to mobilize the losers in an earlier “illegitimate” round 
of redistribution to take big risks to restore the status quo ante (McDermott, 1998). Similar 
processes could also be at work driving intense resistance to the impact of global capitalism 
on climate change or driving Islamic radicals to restore the original Islamic state. From our 
standpoint, the “system” in system justifi cation is underdefi ned.
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136 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
of distributive justice, fi nding that each principle proved infl uential to some 
extent, except that merit considerations only infl uenced women’s judg-
ments of justice in this study. In a second study, this research group (Mi-
chelbach, Scott, Matland, & Bornstein, 2003) replicated their fi nding that in-
dividuals try to balance equality, effi ciency, need, and merit in their justice 
judgments, but they failed to replicate the gender gap in meritocracy con-
cerns found in their fi rst study. However, this second study did fi nd a racial 
gap in meritocracy concerns, with the nature of equality-effi ciency trade-offs 
by White participants dependent on their merit assumptions but not those 
of racial minorities. Also, Michelbach and colleagues (2003), with a refi ne-
ment to the hypothetical-society paradigm that provided a cleaner test be-
tween egalitarianism and Rawls’ maximin principle than that employed in 
our original study (Mitchell et al., 1993), found that a signifi cant number of 
participants endorsed the maximin principle, but many others deemed merit 
an important principle and deviated from a strict adherence to the maximin 
principle.
 These studies by Scott and others support our original fi nding (Mitchell 
et al., 1993) that impartial spectators often place considerable weight on 
equality and the maximin principle when making justice judgments, espe-
cially when meritocracy is lacking. However, these studies and their fi nd-
ings of gender and racial gaps in the weight placed on meritocracy in justice 
judgments also caution against generalizations about the role of meritocracy 
in justice judgments and suggest that White men, women, and minorities, 
who may have had very different experiences with meritocracy in the United 
States, may have diffi culty divesting themselves of their life experiences and 
placing themselves in the position of impartial observer. 
 Most recently, we used the hypothetical-society paradigm to examine 
the longstanding debate in legal theory on the relationship between correc-
tive justice and distributive justice (Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006). 5 Some legal 
philosophers claim that corrective justice is parasitic on distributive justice, 
with the one who has caused a harm (the “tortfeasor” in legalese) having 
a duty only to repair the harm imposed on another if the underlying dis-
tribution of goods disturbed was just, whereas others claim that corrective 
justice and distributive justice impose independent moral demands on mem-
5 Corrective justice stipulates, roughly, that a person who wrongfully causes harm to another 
has a duty to repair the harm (see Forde-Mazrui, 2004). The concept of corrective justice goes 
back to Aristotle and his distinction between justice in transactions, or arithmetic forms of 
justice, and justice in overall distributions within a polity, or geometric forms justice (see 
Weinrib, 2002).
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 137
bers of a society that cannot be traded off against one another. To test the 
competing views, we constructed distributively just and unjust hypotheti-
cal societies—with distributive justice operationalized in terms of meeting 
needs, equality, and desert—and told participants of certain intentional and 
unintentional torts occurring in these societies that upset the distribution of 
resources in these just and unjust societies. The task for participants was to 
declare whether justice required the tortfeasor to make the victim of the tort 
whole, as a norm of corrective justice would require. 
 We found, somewhat to our surprise in light of much empirical research 
showing the context sensitivity of competing norms of justice (see Miller, 
1999), that the norm of corrective justice consistently trumped distributive 
justice norms, even where enforcing the norm of corrective justice would lead 
to a more unjust distribution of resources in the community (i.e., in a society 
with no meritocracy, where an undeserving poor man had to compensate an 
undeserving rich man for harm negligently done by the poor man, leading 
to greater inequality and greater unmet needs). Indeed, in many conditions, 
there was near unanimity that the tortfeasor should make the victim whole, 
even when participants judged the society to be unjust and the victim had 
insurance that would cover the harm done. 
 Only under conditions of extreme injustice in the distribution of resources 
did most participants deem it just that tortious harm go unrepaired. Thus, in 
a hypothetical society in which a racial minority perpetuated its hold over 
power through discriminatory policies, most liberal participants and some 
conservative participants felt that justice did not require that an impover-
ished member of the oppressed majority compensate a wealthy member 
of the racially oppressive minority who had been harmed by the former’s 
negligence. However, when the poor member of the racially oppressed class 
intentionally stole a valuable watch owned by the rich man, most partici-
pants judged this action out of bounds as a matter of justice, even though 
it arguably is a form of self-help that would lead to a more just distribution 
of wealth in this racially unjust society (with half of the liberal participants 
and more than half of the conservative participants judging justice to require 
compensation for this intentional tort). 
 Such fi ndings are signifi cant in at least two ways. First, they demon-
strate the importance of adding corrective justice norms to the list of justice 
concerns that may be triggered by context (see Konow, 2003), and they il-
lustrate that this norm will be potent, and likely dominant, in contexts that 
emphasize transactional harms. These fi ndings emphasize the importance 
placed on personal responsibility for rectifying harms done, at least among 
our sample of Americans, and cast into doubt the popularity of social com-
pensation schemes for accidents, such as New Zealand’s taxpayer-funded, 
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138 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
no-fault accident fund. To date, there has been little research into corrective 
justice, but our fi ndings point out the need to understand the scope, source, 
and function of the norm of corrective justice and its relation to retributive 
justice, which has received more empirical attention (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 
2003; Tetlock et al., 2007), but both of which have received less attention than 
distributive and procedural justice. 
 Second, these fi ndings further illustrate the malleability of the hypotheti-
cal-society paradigm. Outside the admittedly highly stylized hypothetical-
society paradigm, it would be very diffi cult to disentangle competing the-
oretical positions on the relationship between norms of distributive and 
corrective justice. The simplicity of the paradigm makes it easy to eliminate 
confounding variables and test alternative explanations for why people view 
certain social arrangements to be just or unjust. We explore some of the un-
tapped potential of the hypothetical-society paradigm in the next  section. 
 USING HYPOTHETICAL SOCIETIES TO CLARIFY RIVAL 
THEORETICAL POSITIONS 
 The hypothetical-society paradigm arguably gives us a chance to glimpse 
relatively pure value judgments, undistorted by the usual real-world mix of 
either clashing interest groups or clashing ideological views of the magni-
tude and causes of social problems. We fi nd that, although some respondents 
do fi t sharply defi ned ideological ideal types—committed egalitarians and 
libertarians—the aggregate data are more consistent with an alternative por-
trait of how most people make decisions in these spectator roles: a value plu-
ralism account (Berlin, 1990; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996). 
It is as if people were trying—not necessarily successfully—to  balance com-
peting values, with the relative importance of certain values holding quite 
fi rm against the counter-pressures thus far applied and the relative impor-
tance of other values showing considerable lability and context  specifi city. 
 The stablest commitments so far seem to be to a safety net and corrective 
justice. Like good egalitarian collectivists, people care a lot about ensuring 
that no one falls below a basic-need safety net across a wide range of circum-
stances (Frankfurt, 1987), and like good property-rights individualists (and 
also Durkheimians, in Tetlock et al., 2007), people care a lot about ensuring 
that norm violators are punished across a wide array of socio-economic back-
ground conditions. If we gave voice to these sentiments, they might sound 
like this: “Give us safety nets (for we know that people can fall far through 
no fault of their own—and in any event, it pains us to see others suffer), but 
hold all norm violators, even the poor, accountable to the precepts of correc-
tive justice, lest we revert to the law of the jungle.” 
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 139
 By contrast, other values oscillate more in importance across background 
societal conditions. Like good egalitarian collectivists, people give heaviest 
weight to equality when they think the society has deviated from the ide-
als of meritocracy, but like good capitalist individualists, people give heavi-
est weight to effi ciency and wealth maximization—and resist redistribution 
most intensely—when society is highly meritocratic and the wealth transfer 
process ineffi cient (a “leaky bucket” for transferring assets). Also, intrigu-
ingly, people are most likely to polarize along ideological lines when there 
is greatest ambiguity about meritocracy—arguably the most realistic of the 
conditions in hypothetical-society experiments, as our participants consis-
tently liken American society to the moderate-meritocracy society in our 
studies—perhaps a sign that real-world conditions create the most room for 
implicit ideological values (better to err in the leftward or rightward direc-
tion) to come into play. 
 Skeptics of the hypothetical-society paradigm could argue, however, that 
it only taps into relatively superfi cial psychological processes to which peo-
ple have ready conscious access and that people are not embarrassed about 
revealing. The skeptics would be correct that we have thus far tended to 
take the intuitive political philosophies of our respondents at face value. If 
respondents say that they are Rawlsian egalitarians (Rawls, 1971) or Nozick-
ian libertarians (Nozick, 1974) or value pluralists in the mold of Isaiah Berlin 
(1990), and respond in that spirit to our instruments, we classify them ac-
cordingly. These ideal-type belief system models are best classifi ed as trans-
parent-motivational theories that make the working assumption that people 
are lay political philosophers struggling to make sense of the world and bal-
ance reasonable arguments against each other. From the skeptics’ perspec-
tive, we have yet to explore seriously the possibility that motives to which 
our respondents do not have conscious access (or might be embarrassed to 
admit) are swaying their judgments of macro-level distributive justice. It is 
useful, therefore, to consider how a system justifi cation theorist might ex-
plain our data—and explore how we might reconfi gure hypothetical-society 
experiments to clarify and eventually disentangle the predictions we might 
expect from SJT and alternative accounts, such as our own. 
 System justifi cation theorists could argue that our fi ndings are simply 
a special case of their own demonstrations that people will accept explana-
tions that justify the status quo, regardless of the objective accuracy of the 
explanation (Haines & Jost, 2000). But our fi nding that respondents often 
favored changes to a status quo that they judged unjust seems hard to square 
with an authoritarian–acquiescence version of SJT. Nonetheless, system jus-
tifi cation theorists could counter that the motive to system-justify operates 
only when one’s own status or societal hierarchy is at stake, in which case the 
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140 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
hypothetical-society paradigm will be dismissed as too hypothetical to be 
relevant. 6 However, if cognitive and motivational components of system jus-
tifi cation are triggered automatically by status-relevant stimuli (e.g., Jost & 
Hunyady, 2002), if system justifi cation processes are triggered regardless 
of personal responsibility for the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), and if 
system justifi cation beliefs comprise an “ideology” that people rely on to 
interpret, respond to, and assimilate new stimuli (e.g., Blasi & Jost, 2006; 
Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), then the hypothetical nature of our societies—in 
which we can simulate inequalities in existing societies but remove all am-
biguity about causation—should not be a barrier to our experiments serving 
as a testing ground for SJT. 7
 Alternatively, system justifi cation theorists could argue that hypotheti-
cal-society researchers have merely reconfi rmed that people have a moral 
preference for social orders roughly similar to the world they currently in-
habit: democratic capitalist states, with safety nets of varying height, com-
mitted to individualistic norms of justice. Indeed, we would never dispute 
that the societal status quo is a powerful anchor for moral-political judgment 
(even in hypothetical societies, as our distribution/redistribution mindset 
manipulation showed): we strongly suspect that if we could bring the vast 
numbers of antebellum Americans who regarded slavery as a reasonable 
6 To address this specifi c concern, we note that the hypothetical-society approach could be 
modifi ed to fi t a number of systems about which the experimenter could credibly claim to 
have undisputed factual information, but that are much less hypothetical or unreal than in 
our studies to date. Most promising would be a “hypothetical class action” study in which 
the parties have stipulated to all relevant factual matters and agree on the future impact of 
different remedies but disagree on the desirability of, or need for, different remedies. Partici-
pants then would be tasked with setting policy for the organization going forward, with the 
policy options set along a continuum anchored by status quo preservation on one end and 
radical reform on the other.
7 Indeed, the experimental paradigm employed by Jost and Burgess (2000) and discussed in 
Jost (2001) bears some resemblance to our hypothetical-society studies. In that paradigm, the 
experimenters manipulate participants’ perceptions of the relative socioeconomic success of 
alumni of their own university and a competing university to examine how these perceptions 
affect explanations for differential success and evaluations of these groups. Studies along 
these lines, in which arcane matters of public policy are chosen such that participants may 
be led to believe that facts associated with different policies are real, may be additional good 
candidates for some of the “stress testing” of system justifi cation theory that we propose in 
the next few subsections.
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 141
accommodation in the mid-19th century into contemporary America, those 
individuals would bear little psychological resemblance to whatever patho-
logical fringe of the current population endorses race war and the oppres-
sion of minorities. 8
 We would counter that, at minimum, the hypothetical-society paradigm 
has already revealed a good deal about what varying viewpoints consider 
plausible justifi cations for varying social orders. For instance, it is telling 
that even many hard-core conservatives embrace equality when confronted 
with a hypothetical society in which one’s socio-economic status has been 
determined randomly, not by skill and hard work. And even many hard-core 
liberals embrace effi ciency when confronted with a hypothetical society in 
which one’s socio-economic status has been determined entirely by hard in-
dividual work, with no role for chance. If even the belief systems of hard-core 
ideologues (who might be hypothesized to resemble in profi le extreme low 
and high scorers on the system justifi cation scale) acknowledge boundary 
conditions on their belief systems, so, too, should researchers who are try-
ing to model the political-psychological functioning of these belief systems. 
Indeed, we would argue that our studies, which focus on choices between 
alternative social systems, provide more direct evidence on the operation 
of putative system justifi cation motives than do system justifi cation studies 
that focus on attitudes toward high- versus low-status groups that typically 
are subject to both false- and veridical-consciousness interpretations. 9 From 
this standpoint, the largest lacuna in system justifi cation research is the pau-
city of research into the motive–behavior linkage—it is one thing to argue 
8 We acknowledge, however, that the psychological similarities may be more pronounced be-
tween support for slavery in antebellum America and support for anti-redistributive policies 
in the early 21st century. But we caution against the historicist fallacy that those similarities 
shed light on who has the normative high ground in policy debates in the early 21st century. 
For instance, the same integratively simple style of reasoning that led Churchill to oppose 
self-government for India also led him to see Nazi Germany as an existential threat to the 
British Empire—and the same absolutist reasoning that led fi re-eater defenders of slavery to 
secede from the United States also led abolitionists to pressure Lincoln to defi ne the Civil War 
as a war against slavery (Tetlock, Armor, & Peterson, 1994).
9 Certainly some system justifi cation studies employ behavioral measures (e.g., Jost, Pelham, & 
Carvallo, 2002) and assess preferences and beliefs potentially relevant to the social order (e.g., 
Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; Jost, 1997), but many examine attitudes and stereotypes about 
ingroups and outgroups that vary in their socioeconomic status and do not directly examine 
system-justifying behaviors.
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142 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
that humans are adept at rationalizing outcomes and quite another to argue 
that these rationalizations have deleterious effects on low-status groups (as 
Blasi & Jost [2006] suggest is true with respect to underutilization of the legal 
system by disadvantaged groups; see also O’Brien & Major [2005] and Jost & 
Thompson [2000] for evidence on the positive and negative effects of system-
justifying beliefs on psychological well-being, respectively, for high- and 
low-status groups). 
 We would also counter that existing hypothetical-society research 
has barely scratched the surface of the conceptual complexities of macro-
level distributive justice—and of how ordinary people reason their way 
through these dilemmas. The more we grapple with these complexities, 
the more sharply we will understand both the strengths and limitations 
of  subterranean- motivational theories, such as SJT, and more transparent-
 motivation theories, such as the value pluralism model. Blasi and Jost (2006, 
p. 1124) stake out a provocative position on the generality of the system jus-
tifi cation motive: “Most of the time, people have a general, inherently con-
servative tendency to accept the legitimacy of whatever ‘pecking order’ is 
in effect and to perceive existing institutions and practices as generally rea-
sonable and just, at least until proven otherwise.” We are unsure how much 
we disagree with this claim, but we do believe that the hypothetical-society 
paradigm provides a useful vehicle for clarifying the key points of ambiguity 
that cause us to withhold judgment. Accordingly, we devote the remainder 
of this chapter to identifying how the paradigm can be used to clarify and 
test the predictions of the rival theoretical camps. 
 Clarifi cation is the critical fi rst step because verbal theories can often be 
read in many ways, and this is true both of our belief system ideal types de-
rived from hypothetical-society work and of SJT. With that key caveat, our 
reading of SJT is that the ideal-type system justifi er should be automatically 
sympathetic, across a broad range of background conditions, to any hierar-
chy that resembles the system onto which that individual imprinted during 
political socialization (Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004), whereas the ideal-type 
antithesis of a system justifi er in the United States should strongly prefer 
equality (or rebelliousness) across an equally broad range of societal back-
ground conditions. Insofar as ideologues at either end of this continuum 
qualify their support for, or rejection of, inequality, we have evidence either 
that these observers are mindlessly allowing for exceptions already permit-
ted in their home society or that these observers are thoughtfully qualifying 
their original one-size-fi ts-all ideological templates by taking individuating 
information into account. This difference is, in our view, a big one. If the lat-
ter, we have evidence for what we view as value-pluralism boundary condi-
tions on system justifi cation: people may justify the status quo only up to 
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Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations 143
the point at which they feel the status quo is justifi able given their internal-
ized schemata and values for judging fair play. Put differently, such data 
would show that the justifi cations in system justifi cation theory should not 
be viewed as merely epiphenomenal; there may be a critical feedback link-
age between the justifi cations that people articulate and the changes to the 
systemic status quo they are willing to consider. 
 HOW RESOLUTELY SUPPORTIVE OF INEQUALITY 
MUST ONE BE TO QUALIFY AS A SYSTEM JUSTIFIER? 
 Unless system justifi cation theorists adopt the orthodox positivist position 
that system justifi ers are simply high scorers on the system justifi cation 
scale—a position that hobbles cross-theory dialogue—we see a need to clar-
ify the boundary conditions for distinguishing refl exive (mindless) system 
justifi ers from political observers whose value systems and sense of fair play 
lead them to approve certain types of social-systemic arrangements—and 
condemn others. Here, we see value in turning to the hypothetical-society 
paradigm, because there are many ways to adapt this paradigm to probe 
how far system justifi ers are prepared to go in defending inequality (and the 
types of dissonance-reduction strategies that they are prepared to use to triv-
ialize awkward facts and to eliminate any need to change their minds). Here, 
we consider the possible reactions of high system justifi ers to two categories 
of dissonant data: (a) those on intergenerational mobility, and (b) those on 
the effects of free trade on national security. 
 “Tormenting” Conservatives with Dissonant Data 
on Intergenerational Mobility 
 In the fi rst generation of hypothetical-society research, we were content 
with crude operational defi nitions of meritocracy that manipulated the 
relative importance of hard work versus luck in determining income. But 
many observers fi nd it diffi cult to view a society as meritocratic if one’s sta-
tus is determined by genetic lottery—and the children of the relatively poor 
have virtually no chance of rising into a higher class, whereas the children 
of the relatively wealthy are virtually guaranteed of remaining in that class 
(Rawls, 1971; Fishkin, 1983). It follows that social science research on inter-
generational mobility has relatively high political stakes. As we saw in the 
earlier hypothetical-society studies, most people move in an egalitarian or 
leftward direction on income transfers when they are confronted with a low-
 meritocracy society. 
 This raises the question of how high scorers on system justifi cation, or—as 
we suspect they are—conservatives (for the view that political conservatism 
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144 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATUS QUO
largely is system justifi cation, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), 
respond to hypothetical societies in which meritocracy is not specifi ed but 
must be inferred from data on intergenerational mobility. We conjecture that 
the fi rst cognitive reaction of high system justifi ers should be to assume that 
the observed patterns of inequality are legitimate (or justifi ed), and that cog-
nitively sophisticated system justifi ers should be predisposed to defend the 
status quo by invoking the currently politically acceptable justifi cations for 
inequality—namely, the system follows the norms of meritocracy and equal-
ity of opportunity. The hypothetical-society paradigm allows us, however, to 
“stress test” this belief system by manipulating key background facts on in-
tergenerational mobility that cut off favorite conservative dissonance reduc-
tion strategies. Promising manipulations include: (a) inequality is growing 
(the distance between the economic cellar and economic penthouse), thus 
cutting off the argument that things are getting better; (b) it is becoming in-
creasingly diffi cult for people to rise from poverty to prosperity in one or 
even two generations, thus cutting off the Horatio-Alger-style anecdotes of 
rags-to-riches success; (c) there is no evidence that richer children have better 
prospects than poorer children because they have genetic endowments bet-
ter suited to facilitate success in competitive market economies or because 
their parents do a better job bringing them up and inculcating character traits 
conducive to success (more intelligent, more optimistic, higher energy levels, 
etc.), thus cutting off arguments of either biological or cultural superiority; 
and (d) there is evidence that stereotypes and prejudice are key factors re-
straining upward mobility among the poor. 
 From our value-pluralism perspective, which holds that people rely 
on simple modes of dissonance reduction until they are forced by circum-
stances to embrace more complex modes, this series of factual constraints 
in the hypothetical society should drive conservatives to adopt more inte-
gratively complex (and centrist) policy positions. This is so because we have 
now narrowed the range of plausible explanations for social inequality in 
the hypothetical society to two salient candidates: better schools for the rich 
and better networking opportunities for the rich. We suspect that when the 
trade-offs are made this transparent, only the hardest-core conservatives and 
system justifi ers will still resist egalitarian policy interventions designed to 
improve schooling opportunities and networking opportunities for the poor 
(e.g., generous vouchers and affi rmative action outreach—although not de 
facto or de jure quotas—which activate a new set of value trade-offs). These 
hard-right dissenters might argue—in Burkean fashion—that previous gen-
erations of parents worked hard to ensure that their descendents would have 
advantages, so it is a bad idea to destabilize that societal expectation. But 
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we also suspect that most conservatives and system justifi ers will, at this 
 juncture, make policy concessions and accept the need for egalitarian inter-
ventions of some form. 
 An unresolved question is how system justifi cation theorists should react 
to such a result. We obviously cannot speak for them but we favor the fol-
lowing accommodation: people tend to be system justifi ers up to the point at 
which they feel they can no longer justify the system because it violates an 
internalized ethical schema of fair play. If there remains a difference between 
our position and that of system justifi cation, it is our objection to labeling 
any ethical schema that happens to favor the status quo as merely serving 
a system justifi cation function. Here we see a classic fuzzy-set functional-
ist judgment call (Tetlock, 2002), with tough questions for both camps. The 
tough question for us is: How far must perceptions and reality diverge be-
fore we grant that the perceptions serve a system justifi cation rather than an 
object appraisal function? The tough question for them is: How grounded in 
reality must perceptions be before they grant that perceptions serve an object 
appraisal as opposed to a system justifi cation function? 
 “Tormenting” System Justifi ers with Dissonant Data 
on the Effects of Trade on National Sovereignty 
 In the fi rst generation of hypothetical-society research, we brought the val-
ues of economic and market effi ciency into confl ict with the values of social 
equality, but we never brought market effi ciency into confl ict with another 
value also likely to rank high in the moral-political priorities of conservatives 
and, by implication, high system justifi ers. National sovereignty and security 
are promising candidates. 
 Consider the problems posed by international trade. For orthodox, free 
market theorists, the logic of comparative advantage holds that the surest 
method of promoting prosperity is by permitting the free fl ow of goods, 
services, capital, and human beings across borders. If only rich countries 
would just quit erecting protectionist barriers that prevent poor people 
from working their way out of poverty, there would be much less pov-
erty in the world today. Of course, this surgically simple solution can have 
painful side effects—international trade can produce major dislocations 
within societies. American blue-collar workers accustomed to earning $25 
per hour run the risk of losing their jobs to Mexican workers glad to make 
$5 per hour—and these Mexican workers, in turn, risk losing their jobs to 
Chinese workers glad to make only $2 per hour. 
 We suspect that conservatives, and especially libertarian conservatives, 
are much less worried than those on the left about the power of trade to 
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increase inequality within their home society (see parallel section below on 
“tormenting” system critics). But there may well be conditions under which 
conservatives do become alarmed about the effects of international trade. 
Consider how the following combination of facts in a hypothetical-society 
paradigm would become increasingly dissonant for a conservative: (a) the 
target society has a mutually benefi cial trading relationship with another 
society, but the other society is reaping much larger economic growth ben-
efi ts from the trade; (b) the other society is a potential military rival that is 
translating signifi cant fractions of its rapidly growing economy into greater 
military strength; and (c) the dominant social class in the target society has a 
strong vested interest in the continuation of the trading relationship with the 
other society (a disproportionate share of the benefi ts of the trade fl ow to this 
elite group within the target society) (see Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro, 
2001).
 Here, again, our suspicion would be that even high system justifi ers will 
be hard-pressed to justify supporting the interest of the dominant class in a 
society so confi gured. There comes a point at which enough is enough: the 
status quo loses its legitimacy, and even those predisposed to justify the global 
free market status quo give up the cause. Again, although one may dismiss 
this stress testing of system justifi cation theory on grounds that observers 
are judging a hypothetical status quo, not their own—the real—world, this 
approach at least promises evidence on the boundary conditions of SJT: Are 
system justifi cation tendencies so automatic, and unconscious rationaliza-
tion tendencies so strong, that system justifi cation continues even when the 
obvious routes to rationalizing the legitimacy of the status quo have explic-
itly been cut off and the system in question is nominally hypothetical, or can 
these tendencies be overridden by cutting off normal rationalization routes 
at the conscious level and, if so, how easily may people be divorced from 
their system justifying ideologies (or, in the case of the disadvantaged, freed 
from the fog of false consciousness) (Jost, 1995)? 
 How Resolutely Opposed to Inequality 
Should One Be to Qualify as a System Critic? 
 Fair play requires subjecting those on the left to the functional equivalent of 
the dissonance-maximizing treatments infl icted on those on the right: How 
far are left-leaning respondents prepared to go in opposing all forms of in-
equality? And what types of dissonance-reduction strategies are they pre-
pared to adopt to defl ect bothersome facts that pressure them to change their 
minds? We focus on two examples: (a) reactions to increasingly dissonant 
data on the sources of social inequality within the home society, and (b) reac-
tions to increasingly dissonant data on the impact of protectionist barriers 
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designed to protect workers in one’s own society but at the price of infl icting 
great suffering on much poorer workers in other societies. 
 “Tormenting” System Critics with Dissonant Data 
on Social Inequality 
 In the fi rst generation of hypothetical-society work, we explored the will-
ingness of those on the left to reject increasingly meritocratic hypotheti-
cal societies by manipulating the importance of effort/ability as causes 
of socio-economic status. But we never subjected the left to tougher ideo-
logical tests that probed just how far they were willing to go in pursuit 
of equality as an end goal that trumps all other competing ends. Imagine, 
therefore, a hypothetical society in which we preempt arguments for a wide 
range of egalitarian policy interventions by stipulating that: (a) the society 
already rigorously enforces equality-of-opportunity laws, thus undercut-
ting the dissonance-reduction strategy that inequality could be eliminated 
if only more aggressive action were taken against ongoing discrimination; 
(b) the society has no history of ethnic or racial prejudice, thus undercut-
ting the strategy of arguing that inequality could be eliminated if only ag-
gressive action were taken against the residual effects of past injustices; 
(c) the inequalities create powerful incentives for effi ciency and economic 
growth from which all benefi t, thus undercutting the strategy of arguing 
that inequality could be eliminated (without making everyone poorer) if 
taxation policy reallocated wealth; (d) the relatively poor are, by current 
objective standards of purchasing power, already very well-off, further un-
dercutting need-based humanitarian arguments for equality; (e) the poor 
are satisfi ed with the fairness of the system or even that the poor are more 
satisfi ed with the conditions of their lives than the wealthy and are mak-
ing work–leisure trade-offs in favor of leisure and less income (in other 
words, the poor realize that, beyond a certain point, which they feel they 
have reached, higher income does not buy greater happiness; Kahneman, 
Krueger, & Schkade, 2006); (f) scientifi c evidence has revealed that chil-
dren from wealthier families have genetic endowments that are, on aver-
age, better adapted for success in competitive market economies and that, 
whenever lower-class children have the “right stuff,” they do indeed rise 
into higher socio- economic classes (thus reaffi rming that equality of op-
portunity does exist); (g) scientifi c research indicates that, short of mandat-
ing poverty for all, there are only two remaining mechanisms for breaking 
down social class barriers—nature or nurture—either genetic engineering 
designed to level the DNA playing fi eld or socializing the task of socializing 
children and requiring that all children be raised in state-run institutions 
that prevent higher-class parents from giving special advantages to their 
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children (from elaborate bedtime stories to excessive homework help) and 
lower-class parents from teaching their children impulsive and hedonistic 
values detrimental to success. 
 Choreographing the background facts to maximize dissonance for egali-
tarians is obviously a complex, iterative process, best done in adversarial 
collaboration with rival theoretical camps. Here, though, we are most in-
terested in the choices that egalitarians make when the only economically 
and technologically feasible method of achieving egalitarian goals requires 
acknowledging the tension between the values of social equality and family 
autonomy. 
 Radical egalitarians—from Rousseau to Marx—have long recognized 
this tension: as long as the family is the social unit primarily responsible for 
socializing children, and as long as some families are (even holding income 
constant) prepared to make much greater sacrifi ces to ensure the success of 
their children, it is logically impossible to achieve equality of opportunity. 
Socializing children is a relatively easy choice from this radically egalitar-
ian point of view—and many socialist governments have indeed pursued 
this “it-takes-a-village” option (from Israeli kibbutzim to Scandinavian day 
care to Chinese communes). Conservative and libertarian philosophers have 
long resisted such arguments and warned that transferring the task of social-
izing children to the state is both a violation of parental rights and a dan-
gerous step toward totalitarianism and collective mind control. Rejecting a 
prominent state role in childcare is a relatively easy choice from these points 
of view. 
 Our working hypothesis is, however, that, for most people, the choice is 
a tough one. We suspect that most people—system critics and system justi-
fi ers alike—are value pluralists who are deeply torn by this value confl ict 
and oscillate erratically between favoring family autonomy versus equality 
of opportunity as a function of horror stories of child neglect and abuse (fa-
voring the left) and horror stories of state mind control and parents losing 
parental rights for “trivial” reasons (favoring the right). Extrapolating from 
earlier work on the value pluralism model (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock et al., 1996), 
we also suspect that people (especially egalitarians now) can be motivated to 
invest the necessary cognitive effort to generate complex compromise solu-
tions to the dilemma only to the degree that we have systematically blocked 
off simple modes of dissonance resolution in the hypothetical societies. These 
tempting simpler modes of dissonance reduction include challenging the 
“fact situation” posited in the hypothetical society (such as “the poor aren’t 
really as happy as the rich; that is just false consciousness” and  “behavioral-
genetics claims are just racist”) and trying to fi nd a trade-off-free solution 
(creating a state-funded system in which social class distinctions disappear 
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because everyone develops to her full potential). The key question is: What 
value trade-offs do egalitarians make when constrained by the factual and 
causal ground rules of the hypothetical society—and when they cannot 
make up facts of their own liking? The value pluralism model predicts that 
the more highly respondents value both equality and the family, the more 
excruciatingly complex the judgment calls will become of balancing parental 
control and social equality in designing exact institutional rules. If integra-
tively complex policy reasoning is a reasonable approximation of one’s ideal 
cognitive process outcome (and that seems to be the case for advocates of 
deliberative democracy; e.g., Fishkin, 1992), this would be how to achieve it 
via the hypothetical-society paradigm. 
 The process may seem torturous because the goal is to explore the con-
ditions under which even unrelenting system critics relent. Or, framed as a 
question for system justifi cation theorists, how dogmatic (principled) an op-
ponent of inequality must system critics be to avoid reclassifi cation as system 
justifi ers? For instance, and we doubt that system justifi cation theorists take 
this extreme a position, if the price of avoiding the label “system justifi er” is 
compelling all families to accept a one-size-fi ts-all child-rearing system that 
guarantees equality of outcome, we suspect that 90% plus of the popula-
tion will qualify as system justifi ers. Simply put, would a system justifi cation 
theorist consider adherence to the existing American family structure, which 
vests considerable autonomy and responsibility for child development in the 
parents and which surely breeds societal inequality, evidence of the system 
justifi cation motive at work? If not, why not? In any event, if system justifi ca-
tion is to be more than a vague expression of political disapproval, as system 
justifi cation theorists surely mean it to be, we need much tighter specifi cation 
of the value and policy litmus tests being used—implicitly or explicitly—by 
system justifi cation theorists. 
 “Tormenting” System Critics with International Trade Scenarios 
 In the fi rst generation of hypothetical-society research, we were content to 
rely on crude operational defi nitions of the poverty line, assuming that ev-
eryone shared an understanding of, and aversion to, poverty. What counts as 
poor, however, in one society at one point in history may count as wealthy 
for that same society at a previous point in history or for other societies at 
the same point in history. Upper middle class professionals in parts of sub-
 Saharan Africa in the early 21st century have per capita incomes substantially 
lower (even using a purchasing-power-parity standard) than the average fac-
tory worker in Western Europe or the United States. 
 In the hypothetical-society paradigm, we can require subjects to assume—
as noted earlier—that the logic of comparative advantage in international trade 
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holds: the surest method of reducing large income gaps across societies is by 
promoting the free fl ow of goods, services, capital, and human beings across 
borders. How, then, should one respond if one is an egalitarian asked to judge 
the acceptability of a trade agreement that will increase inequality within one’s 
own wealthy society (because the paychecks of one’s “own” working class are 
in decline as the result of lower labor cost competition in poorer societies) but 
will also raise the absolute standard of living of the poorest people in poor so-
cieties, as well as decrease inequality between societies (by raising the overall 
per capita income of poorer societies closer to that of wealthier societies)? The 
predictions we can extract from SJT presumably hinge on whether we choose 
to defi ne the system critics as cosmopolitan egalitarians, concerned more with 
inequality on a global scale, or as parochial egalitarians, concerned solely with 
inequality within their own society. And the data we can extract from the study 
will probably hinge on the escape routes that we offer respondents in hypo-
thetical societies from this dissonance-inducing problem (escape routes such 
as reserving some wealth generated by free trade for transfer payments to 
help those in one’s own society most adversely affected by free trade, the solu-
tion preferred by value-pluralistic neo-liberals such as Robert Rubin [Rubin & 
Weisberg, 2004] and Thomas Friedman [2005]). 
 Again, the “system” in system justifi cation theory is underdefi ned. 10 The 
theory offers little guidance on how to apply it to complex debates that ac-
tivate clashing values—and on which reasonable people disagree. We see 
roughly equally strong arguments for classifying “egalitarian” protection-
ists in wealthy countries as either system justifi ers or system critics—and 
no good reason to suppose that psychologists deserve any special deference 
in the answers they might give as to which systems should count, except to 
the extent that their answers are founded on empirical data. If conservatives 
become system critics and liberals become system justifi ers in the “America 
becoming more open to international trade” scenario, and if other similar re-
versals can be identifi ed, then it becomes diffi cult to argue that the perpetu-
ation of economic inequality or the defense of the status quo per se generally 
triggers system-justifying tendencies in those deemed high system justifi ers 
in the United States, namely, conservatives (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 
2003; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In such a case, we see the 
benefi t of the hypothetical-society approach as pushing toward a more con-
10 Blasi and Jost (2006) recognize this problem and note the need for studies to determine 
when one system will prevail over another in cases of system confl ict, but to our knowledge, 
little or no research addresses this question.
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textualized theory about the conditions under which system-justifying, and 
system critical, tendencies should occur. 
 CONCLUSION 
 The hypothetical-society paradigm may well be the best of the many im-
perfect methodological means at our disposal for testing the relative merits 
of more transparent-motivational and more subterranean-motivational theo-
ries of public policy reasoning. Here, it is instructive to recall just how deep 
the indeterminacy problems are in testing a theory such as system justifi ca-
tion in the real world. We repeatedly run into variations on C. Wright Mills’ 
 vocabulary-of-motives problem: one person’s reason for holding a belief 
(say, about social class differences in achievement values or about the wis-
dom of the market) can typically be dismissed by others as a mere ratio-
nalization (say, as a means of justifying existing inequality or as evidence 
of insensitivity to the residual effects of past and current discrimination). 
Rubin and Hewstone (2004) make a somewhat analogous point when they 
argue that system justifi cation theory should not get explanatory credit for 
phenomena, such as attributional favoritism toward higher-status groups, 
that could simply be the result of people observing depressing patterns of co-
variation between group membership and outcomes in society at large (e.g., 
the higher levels of crime, family breakdown, drug abuse, school failure, 
and so on among the poor). To use their analogy to a football game, should 
we conclude that members of the losing team who attribute their defeat to 
their own shortcomings are, ipso facto, guilty of outgroup favoritism and 
system justifi cation? Or, should we conclude that they are engaging in highly 
adaptive forms of self-criticism? Indeed, it is worth asking what happens to 
disadvantaged groups that develop political cultures that censure all self-
critical commentary as evidence that the commentator has been co-opted 
by the oppressors. Do they not risk trapping themselves in an ideology of 
victimology?
 The list of Millsian reason-rationalization riddles is a long one. For in-
stance, if one believes that prosperity and economic effi ciency require creating 
incentives for hard work and risk-taking (incentives that inevitably create in-
equality), does that belief count as evidence for the operation of a system jus-
tifi cation motive (one’s belief that the wealthy are being rewarded for merit) 
or as evidence simply that one understands a fundamental scientifi c principle 
of economics (for the former view, see Jost et al., 2003)? If one believes that 
a social system with stable, secure property rights is essential for promoting 
prosperity and economic effi ciency, does that count as evidence of a desire for 
unequal relations among social groups, or does it count as evidence that one 
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has drawn correct lessons from history—at least according to one infl uential 
school of economic history (North, 1981, 2005)? If one believes that ego resil-
ience, intelligence, the capacity to delay gratifi cation, and a strong work ethic 
are found more often among the economically successful, does that count as 
evidence that one has been gulled into accepting system-justifying Horatio 
Alger stories (cf. Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007), as evidence that one is in 
touch with sociological reality (as Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, suggest), or as 
evidence that one has embraced an adaptive illusion (Taylor & Brown, 1988)? 
 These questions are unanswerable in real-world debates because it is 
so easy for advocates—motivated reasoners that we all are to some degree 
(Kunda, 1999)—to invent facts and double standards that conceal poten-
tial trade-offs (an invention process that, if it is to serve its subterranean-
 motivational function, should occur out of awareness and be invisible to 
others). But these questions become answerable in the hypothetical-society 
paradigm because it is so diffi cult for advocates to conceal the same trade-offs 
in a world in which all of the key factual parameters have been specifi ed by 
experimental fi at. The hypothetical-society paradigm then becomes the plat-
form for previously impossible conversations between theorists. For instance, 
even if we are right and if transparent-motivational theories can outmaneuver 
subterranean-motivational theories in carefully choreographed hypothetical 
societies that compel conscious acknowledgment of complex value trade-offs, 
subterranean-motivational theorists still have a number of reasonable counter-
arguments. They can posit that socially undesirable motivational forces only 
come into play when enough attributional ambiguity exists to permit ratio-
nalization covers—or that such motives only come into play in settings that 
better simulate real-world status relationships. We do not dismiss such argu-
ments as patch-up operations of a degenerating research program. Such de-
fenses may well be defensible, and the best way to tell is by gradually adding 
the requisite complexity and realism to hypothetical-society studies. 
 In brief, if we want to escape otherwise intractable disputes over political 
motive attribution, we need to explore human judgment in imaginary social 
worlds that we can experimentally manipulate in precisely targeted ways 
that refl ect the key conceptual parameters of real-world political debates. 
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